Female baboons do not raise the stakes but they give as good as they get Received 6 September 1999; initial acceptance 26 October 1999; final acceptance 13 December 1999; MS. number: 6346) We used data from four chacma baboon, Papio cynocephalus ursinus, troops, living in two populations, to test the raise the stakes (RTS) strategy of reciprocity. Female baboons did not raise the stakes either within or across grooming bouts. Instead they time-matched grooming contributions and divided grooming into short episodes. In addition, analysis of the grooming behaviour of frequently versus infrequently grooming dyads did not reveal differences in grooming patterns predicted by the RTS strategy. We suggest time constraints preclude the escalation of grooming bout length as required by RTS; the data were more consistent with a strategy of give as good as you get. However, this strategy could not explain all the patterns observed, and we conclude that biological market theory represents a more appropriate framework for investigating female grooming dynamics than dyadic games based on the iterated prisoner's dilemma. We suggest that competitive altruism among individuals acts as a market force influencing an individual's value as a grooming partner.
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The theory of reciprocal altruism and the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) have received widespread attention as explanations for the occurrence of altruism between unrelated individuals. Despite the theoretical value of these ideas, they have proved difficult to test in real biological systems. This is a consequence of the problems involved in quantifying precisely the costs and benefits of particular actions, especially when these are in different currencies (e.g. Seyfarth & Cheney 1988), as well as difficulty in determining the exact nature of the payoff matrix (Milinski 1987; Godin & Davis 1995; Milinski et al. 1997 ).
In recent years, two approaches have been used in an attempt to circumvent these problems. First, a number of authors have proposed alternative models of reciprocity and cooperation that do not rely on the prisoner's dilemma (e.g. parcelling, pseudoreciprocity: Connor 1995a, b; biological markets: Noë & Hammerstein 1995). The alternative tack has been to modify the IPD game by allowing more realistic assumptions to govern individual players' actions and permit the development of more flexible strategies, with the aim of deriving predictions that are easier to test empirically.
In the most recent of such models, Roberts & Sherratt (1998) allowed individuals to 'test the water' before embarking on a full-blown cooperative relationship as a means of avoiding defection and exploitation. In this view, cooperation need not take place in an all-or-none fashion, but can build up gradually over the course of a series of interactions, allowing individuals to gain 'confidence' or 'trust' in their partners. Roberts & Sherratt (1998) formulated a strategy called 'raise the stakes' (RTS) which reflected these considerations. An individual playing RTS will increase its investment in a cooperative interaction if its partner matches or betters the individual's own last move. In this way, cooperation gradually increases over time if both players use RTS.
Both Roberts & Sherratt (1998) and Keller & Reeve (1998) have stated that raise the stakes represents an advance on previous formulations of the IPD since it makes predictions that can be tested easily, especially since 'several systems exist in which changes in the level of investment between partners can be followed over time'. More explicitly, Keller & Reeve (1998) suggested that primate grooming patterns represent an example of a system where RTS could apply.
